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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GEORGE EDWARD WIKER,
Plaintiff-RespondentCross Appellant
No. 15326

VS.

ELAINE WIK.ER,
Defendant-Appellant
RESPONDENT-CROSS APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Defendant-Appellant filed a Petition For Modification
of Decree of Divorce, For Contempt and For Order to Show
Cause [R. 77-80] in the District Court for Salt Lake County
seeking to modify the decree of divorce by increasing child
support for the minor child, Verlin Kay, to $100.00 per
month, to increase alimony to $200.00 per month, and to
collect alleged delinquent child support for the child,
Roger Allen Wiker, resulting from Plaintiff-Respondent's
discontinuing such support after Roger turned eighteen years
of age.

Defendant-Appellant also sought attorney's fees and

to punish the Plaintiff-Respondent for contempt.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

The lower court granted Defendant-Appellant's request
for modification of the decree and increased support for the
remaining minor child to $100.00 per month and increased
alimony to $150. 00 per month.

The court denied the claim

for support payments for Roger after his eighteenth birthdav
and dismissed the contempt portion of the order to show
cause.

The court awarded Defendant attorney's fees of

$200.00.

[R. 112-113]

Defendant appealed the denial of her

petition for delinquent support payments for Roger Allen
Wiker.

[R. 114]

Plaintiff cross-appealed the lower court's

decision increasing child support for the minor child,
Verlin Kay, and increasing alimony.

[R.

124 ]

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Appellant seeks an order
affirming the District Court's order and judgment denying
Defendant-Appellant's claim for support payments for Roger
Allen Wiker after May 2 7, 197 5, which is Roger's eighteenth
birthday.

In addition, Plaintiff-Respondent, in his Cross

Appeal seeks a reversal of the lower court's findings of
changed circumstances and of its order and judgment increasi"'
alimony and child support.

2
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EXPLANATION OF PARTIES AND ABBREVIATIONS

George Edward Wiker, Plaintiff in the original divorce
action filed April 29, 1964 [R. 4] is the Plaintiff-RespondentCross Appellant in this case.

He will be referred to in

this brief by his name or, where appropriate, as Plaintiff.
Elaine Wiker, Defendant in the original suit and
Petitioner in this action will be referred to by her name,
or as Defendant.
[R.] is a reference to the Record in this case.
[Tr.] is a reference to the Transcript in this case.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The parties to this action were granted a divorce on
January 29, 1965.

[R. 21]

The original divorce decree

awarded custody of the two youngest minor children, Roger
Allen, then age 7, and Verlin Kay, then age 4, to Defendant,
Elaine Wiker.

[R. 22]

Plaintiff, George Wiker, was ordered

to pay $50.00 per month as support for each child as well as
$45.00 per month as alimony with alimony to increase to
$70.00 per month upon the eldest son's (Raymond) return from
his mission.

[R. 22]

Plaintiff was awarded custody of two

older minor children, Jeanne, then age 15, and George Martin,
then age 14.

[R. 22]

The decree also made a division of

the property of the parties.

3

[R. 21-23]
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Pursuant to an Order to Show Cause filed by Defendant,
the decree was modified and amended on August 3, 1966, to
give custody of Jeanne to Defendant and to require Plaintif'.
to pay $50. 00 per month child support for her.

[R. 31-32]

The decree of divorce was further modified and amended
on October 19, 1967, whereby Defendant was awarded care an<l
custody of George Martin Wiker, then age 17, and Plaintiff
was ordered to pay $40. 00 per month temporary support money
for said son.

[R. 56]

By an order and amendment of decree

dated November 29, 1967, Plaintiff was ordered to pay child
support in the amount of $50. 00 per month for George Martin
and to pay George Martin's dental bills.

[R. 72]

On March 31, 1971, Defendant's employment was terminatec
because she was "too slow and not too accurate in counting,"
[Tr. 24] and because of "illness and physical problems." [R.

110]

In December 1971, she was hospitalized for an operation

[Tr. 24]
The next and last modification and amendment to the
decree prior to the instant order to show cause, occurred in
October 1973.

[R. 107].

(The Findings of Fact No. 2 showing

October, 1974 appears to be in error [R. 109]).

This

amendment to the decree is acknowledged by the trial judge
as follows:
"2.
That subsequent to said decree o~ ·<"'divorce the same was amended, whereby plainnit'
'
·
d vo lunobliga tion to pay support was increas~
tober oi
tarily, pursuant to letter agreement in Oc
1974."
[R. 109]

4
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The Record is not totally clear as to all the details
surrounding the October 1973 amendment.

However, it is

clear there were a series of letters written by Allen
Hodgson, Family Court Cormnissioner [R. 108] whereby the
financial, health and other circumstances of the parties
were considered [R. 107] and the decree amended to increase
Plaintiff's payments to Defendant from $170.00 ($50 per
child child support and $70 alimony] to $220.00 per month
"in support and alimony."

[Tr. 21-23; R. 107-109).

We do

not know how much of this $220.00 was for alimony and how
much for child support. Neither Mr. Hodgson's letter [R.

107] nor the testimony of the parties in court in the
instant action clarifies this matter.

[Tr. 21-23).

However, we do know the October 1973 amendment to the
decree was based upon changed circumstances which occurred
subsequent to the entry of the November 1967 modification
but prior to October 1973, and we further know these are the
same changes in circumstances alleged to exist in the
instant case.

These changed circumstances included Defendant's

loss of employment, her illness, and her operation in 1971,
and her subsequent inability to work full-time.

These were

offset by the fact her home had been completely paid for so
she no longer had to make house payments; she was now
receiving disability payments from Social Security in the
amount of approximately Two Hundred Dollars ($200) per month
lr,vhich is t!"le same income she had in 1964 when the original

5
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1
complaint was filed [R. 5] and also at the time of the 196;
modification [R. 54]]) and her part-time work for and recei···
r·

of goods from church welfare.

[R. 107]

In 1974, the minor child, Verlin Kay, had rheumatic
fever [Tr. 28] which was covered by Plaintiff's insurance.
[Tr. ll-12].

Since that time his illness has only required

medication and an annual physical check-up.

At the time of

trial he had recovered to the extent he was in the Hawaiian
Islands working in a pineapple plantation.

[Tr. 9-10]

In March 1975, the Utah Legislature passed a statute
amending Sec ti on 15-2-1, Utah Code Annotated, lowering the
age of majority for males from 21 to 18.
made effective May 13, 1975.
1975, p. 121.

The statute was

Laws of the State of Utah,

Roger Allen Wiker, child of the parties in

Defendant's custody, reached age eighteen, his statutory
of majority, on May 27, 1975.

[Tr. 4-5]

a~

Relying on the

advice of counsel, Plaintiff ceased paying support for Roger
after that date.

[Tr. 5]

On August 23, 1976, Defendant filed the Petition for
Modification of Decree of Divorce, For Contempt and For
Order to Show Cause [R. 77] that initiated this proceeding
In her petition Defendant sought to increase alimony and
support and to collect support for Roger after he reaclied
age eighteen.

The District Court increased alimony to

$150. 00 per month and child support for the one child Verlin

6
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I

Kay to $100.00 per month.

The Court denied Defendant's

claim for support for Roger after he reached age of majority.
[R. 112-113)

7
I

l
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POINT I

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED AMENDED SECTION
15-2-1, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, PROSPECTIVELY, NOT RETROACTIVELY,
IN DETERMINING THAT PLAINTIFF'S CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION FOR
ROGER CEASED WHEN ROGER TURNED EIGHTEEN BECAUSE THERE IS NO
VESTED RIGHT IN FUTURE CHILD SUPPORT AND BECAUSE THE COURT
TERMINATED CHILD SUPPORT ONLY AFTER THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF
THE STATUTE AND AFTER ROGER REACHED AGE EIGHTEEN, THE AGE OF
MAJORITY UNDER THE AMENDED STATUTE.

The general rule of law, adopted by the Supreme Court
of Utah and applicable in this case, provides that ordinarily,
legislative enactments are applied prospectively and may not
operate retrospectively or retroactively.

McCarrey v. Utah

State Teachers' Retirement Board, 111 Utah 254, 177 P. 2d
725, (1947);

In re Ingraham's Estate, 106 Utah 337, 148 P.

2d 340, (1944).

Defendant has alleged the District Court

applied 15-2-1, as amended, retroactively.

The Utah Supreme

Court, when confronted with a claim that a lower court had
incorrectly applied an amended workman's compensation statute
retroactively, defined retroactive application of a statute
as follows:
"A statute is not made retroactive merely because
it draws on antecedent facts for its operation.
(Citations omitted). A law is retrospective, in
its legal sense, which takes away or imnairs
vested rights acquired under existing laws:"
Silver King Coalition Mines Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 2 Utah 2d 1, 268 P. 2d 689, 692
(1954).
[Emphasis added]
It therefore appears the first test to be applied in
determining whether a statute is being applied retroactive
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is to see whether any vested rights are taken away or impaL,
The answer to this question depends upon the nature of
decree awarding child support payments to Roger.

t~

If all

future child support payments vest automatically when the
decree is entered and cannot be modified nor changed, then
the subsequent statutes can have no affect upon the child
support payments and they must continue until the specified
period has ended.

If on the other hand the future child

support payments do not vest until their monthly due date,
it follows they can be changed or modified by the courts at
any time prior to their due date but not after that time.
In Utah, the law is that the right of the trial court
to modify an alimony or support money award does not extend
to installments which have already accrued and which are
past due, because the right to collect such installments
becomes vested upon their due date.

Openshaw v. Openshaw,

105 U. 574, 144 P. 2d 528 (1943), and Cole v. Cole, 101 Utah

355, 122 P. 2d 201 (1942), and cases cited therein. Consequer:
the courts in Utah may not impair past due installments of
alimony and child support but they can modify those install~e:
that will become due in the future.
In the instant case, the trial judge did not attempt tc
apply amended Section 15-2-1 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 to
any past due installments of child support payments· Rather
he applied the statute only to those installments that
. h

become due after the effective date of the amendment whiC ·

9
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was May 13, 1975, and after the minor child Roger became
eighteen years of age which was may 27, 1975.

This conclusion

by the trial judge is amply demonstrated in paragraph one

(1) of his Conclusions of Law which reads as follows:
"l. That the defendant should be denied judgment
against plaintiff for the claim for delinquent
support payments for the minor child Roger Allen
Wiker, in that he turned age eighteen (18) on or
about May 27, 1975. That the Court concludes that
the law as amended by the Utah Legislature in the
year 1975, relieved plaintiff from paying support
for said minor child after age eighteen (18) under
the Decree of Divorce herein." [R. 110]
Moreover, the doctrine of "vested rights" has never been
interpreted to mean that a parent or child has the right to
support payments for any definite period of time, and age of
majority statutes in affect at the time the divorce decree
is entered do not change that result. Schmitz v. Schmitz,
Wis.

, 236 N.W. 2d 657 (1975); Jungjohann v.

Jungj ohann,
Baril, _ _ Me.

Kan.

, 516 P. 2d 904 (1973); Baril v.

, 354 A. 2d 392 (1976).

Finally, the trial judge's application of 15-2-1 did
not impair any "vested rights" under the original divorce
decree.

"To call child support payments a vested right

misconceives their nature."

Schmitz, supra, at 662.

Under

a decree providing child support until majority, a minor
child has no vested right to support at a specific future
date or age regardless of what age the law establishes as
the age of majority.
t~at a

"(T)he rule has long been recognized

child has no claim or vested right in future child

~rt.

(Emphasis added) Jungjohann, supra, at 908.
10
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"As we have previously stated, the rights of minority are
not fixed or vested rights . .

Jungj ohann, supra, at 909

Age of majority "is a status, modifiable by law, which has
no vested property rights."

Schmitz, supra.

See also

In dealing with virtually identical issues and similar
circumstances as those in the case at bar, courts have
uniformly held that applying a new age of majority statute
to a prior divorce decree does not constitute retroactive
application nor deprivation of vested rights.

These same

courts further hold such statutes do relieve the supportpaying parent of his obligation to contribute child support
when the child, male or female, reaches age of majority
under the amended statutes.

Jungjohann v. Jungjohann, _

Kan. _ _ , 516 P. 2d 904 (1973); Schmitz v. Schmitz, __
Wis. _ _ , 236 N.W. 2d 657 (1975); wnitt v. Whitt, __Tenr.
490 S.W. 2d 159 (1973); Blackburn v. Blackburn,

~

Tenn. __ , 526 S.W. 2d 463 (1975); Allison v. Allison, 44
Ohio App. 2d 230, 337 N.E. 2d 337 (1975); Baril v. Baril,
_ _Me.

, 354 A. 2d 392 (1976); Shoaf v. Shoaf,

N. C. _ _ , 192 S. E. 2d 299 (1972); Fellows v. Fellows,
La. App.

, 267 So. 2d 572 (1972); Baker v. Baker,

217 Kan. 319, 537 P. 2d 171 (1975); Phelps v. Phelps, 85
N.M. 62, 509 P. 2d 254 (1973); Lookout v. Lookout,_
96
526 P. 2d 1405 (1974); Speer v. Quinlan,
Tenn
Idaho ll9' 525 P. 2d 314 (1974); Ga rev v. Garev, _

Okl. App.

__ ,

_ _ , 482 S.W. 2d 133 (1972).
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_.....l

In Schmitz, supra, the divorced husband, following
enactment by the legislature of the statute reducing the age
of majority to eighteen years, ceased making support payments
for children who had reached ages 19 and 20 as of the
effective date of the statute.

The divorced wife petitioned

the court to require the divorced husband to continue support
payments.

The trial court denied the wife's petition.

The

Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed, stating:
"In refusing to order further payments the
trial court noted that the phrase 'minor children'
was the crucial language of the decree, and that
the twenty-one age reference was merely descriptive of the then existing majority status. A new
majority status being defined by Ch. 213, Laws of
1971, the court noted that the decree's application
ceased for those children who attain or attained
eighteen years." Schmitz, supra, at 661.
As to the wife's claim [exactly as the wife Mrs. Wiker
alleges in the instant case] that the trial court incorrectly
applied the new age of majority statute by applying it
retroactively, the Supreme Court held:
"To the extent that the new act does not demand
the return of payments made for the parties'
children who were over age eighteen prior to the
effective date of the law, retroactive application
is clearly avoided.
(Emphasis added). Schmitz,
supra, at 662.
Similarly, in the case at bar, the amended statute (15-

2-1) became effective on May 13, 1975, while the child,
Roger, was only seventeen years old.

The Court did not

apply the statute to support which accrued and was paid
£Iior to the effective date of the statute and prior to
Roger's eighteenth birthday.

Nor did it apply the statute
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to recover support paid by plaintiff for another child,
George Martin Wiker, for the years after George reached
eighteen.

These two app 1 ica tions would have been retroacti;c

Amended Section 15-2-1 was applied to Roger's support
prospectively only, that is, only to support

claimed~

the effective date of the statute and after Roger's eighteen:·
birthday.
The divorce decree in Jungj ohann, supra, provided child
support until the daughter reached age of majority.

At the

time the decree was entered, the age of majority in Kansas
was 21 years.

The daughter turned 18 on August 5, 1971.

The Kansas legislature reduced the age of majority to 18
effective June 1, 1972.

In determining the father's child

support obligation, the Kansas Supreme Court held:
"We hold that where by a decree of divorce a
defendant is required to make child support
payments until a child has reached her age of
majority the duty imposed by such decree is
.
terminated by K. S .A. 1972 (Supp. 38-101) [amendea
Kansas age of majority statute] on the effective
date thereof . . . Jungjohann, supra, at 909.
(Parenthetical explanation and Emphasis added)·
The court in Jungj ohann further held that even though
the divorce decree was entered prior to the effective date
of the statute, application of the amended age of majoricy
statute to child support payments after the statute's
effective date constituted prospective application, not
retroactive, and did not run counter to the rule against
retroactive application of statutes.

The court concluded

13
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"The ruling of the trial court terminated support
payments prospectively from and after July 1,1972. No application was made nor order entered
herein which attempted to operate retrospectively
back to the eighteenth birthday of Elizabeth. The
statute made eighteen the age of majority from and
after July 1, 1972. It affected no rights accrued
before that date. It did not reach back . . . but
only operated from and after the effective date of
July 1, 1972.
[Emphasis added] Jungjohann,
supra.
By the same token, amended Section 15-2-1 of the Utah
Code made 18 the age of majority from and after its effective date.

It did not attempt to terminate the support

payments after the person's 18th birthday when that birthday
occurred prior to the effective date of the act, rather it
operated from and after its effective date of May 13, 1975
and this is the way the trial court applied it.

14
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POINT II

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED SECTION 15-2-1
u.c.A. 1953, AS AMENDED, IN THIS CASE WITHOUT VIOLATING
ARTICLE I SECTION 18 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION WHICH PROHIBITS
EX POST FACTO LAHS OR LAWS IlfPAIRING CONTIACT OBLIGATIONS
BECAUSE SECTION 15-2-1, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, AS AMENDED, WAS
NOT APPLIED EX POST FACTO OR RETROACTIVELY AND BECAUSE
DIVORCE DECREES ARE NOT CONTRACTUAL IN NATURE.

Article I, Section 18, Utah Constitution, prohibits the
enactment of ex post facto laws or laws impairing the obligation of contracts.

Defendant contends that in light of

this Constitutional provision, Section 15-2-1 should have
had no retroactive effect.

Plaintiff has already argued

that the District Court, in the case at bar, applied 15-2-1
prospectively, not retroactively.

[Rather than repeat those

arguments and citations, reference is made to Point I,
above, of this brief. ]
In the case of Allison v. Allison, suora, where the
court faced issues very similar to those in the case at bar,
the custodial parent alleged the apolication of the new age
of majority statute violated the constitutional prohibition
of ex post facto laws.

The Ohio appellate court responded:

"We do not think this is the type of ex post facto action
which Article II, Section 28 of the Ohio Constitution is
designed to prevent."

Allison, at pp. 667-8.

As to defendant's impairment-of-contracts argument, she
seeQs to assume, without foundation or support, that a

15
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divorce decree occupies the status of or is in the nature o'.
a contract.

In Whitt v. 11hi tt, supra, the husband reduced

his child support payments for his eighteen-year-old daughte:
when the legislature lowered the age of majority from 21 to
18.

The wife attempted to enforce the parties' divorce

settlement agreement provisions which required support until
the former age of majority on the grounds such an agreement
was a binding contract.

The Supreme Court didn't disagree

that the agreement, standing alone, was a contract, only
that the divorce decree was not a contract.

The Court held

that:
"When the trial judge accepted this agreement of
the parties. . . and incorporated it in the decree,
the agreement became merged into the decree and
lost its contractual nature.
Whitt, sunra, at
160.
-- ~
The reason divorce decrees are not deemed to be contracts or
contractual in nature "is the continuing statutory power of
the trial court to modify its terms when changed circumstances justify."

Penland v.

Penland,~~

Tenn.

521

S.W. 2d 222 (1975) at 224; Blackburn, ~, at 465.
Thus, it is clear that the District Court's application
of Section 15-2-1 in this case does not violate ex post
facto and impairment of contract prohibitions of the Utah
Constitution.

16
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POINT III

THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL ERROR rn
HOLDrnG THAT PLAINTIFF'S OBLIGATION TO PAY CHILD SUPPORT
CEASED WHEN THE CHILD REACHED AGE EIGHTEEN BECAUSE THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND
DECISIOHS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT PROHIBIT ANY
DISTINCTION BETWEEN MALE AND FEl1ALE AS TO AGE OF MAJO!UTY IN
THE CONTEXT OF CHILD SUPPORT AND BECAUSE THIS COURT HAS
ALREADY DETERMINED AGE OF MAJORITY FOR FEMALES TO BE EIGHTEEN;
BECAUSE THIS COURT HAS ALSO RECOGNIZED THAT ITS DECISION AS
TO AGE OF MAJORITY OF FEMALES HAD THE EFFECT OF IMPOSING
MAJORITY ON BOTH MALES AND FEMALES AT AGE EIGHTEEN; AND
BECAUSE THE AMENDMENT TO SECTION 15-2-1 UCA, 1953, CLARIFIES
THE LAW AND ESTABLISHES AS PUBLIC POLICY THE AGE OF MAJORITY
AT AGE EIGHTEEN.

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
of

the United States Constitution guarantees to individuals

the equal protection of the laws and limits the power of
states to legislate or accord different treatment to individuals
according to differing classifications.

Although it does

not preclude legislative classifications altogether, it
requires that,
"A classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to
the object of the legislation, so that all persons
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike."
Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 13-14, 43 L. Ed.
2d 688, 95 S. Ct. 1373 (1975), quoting from
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 30 L.Ed. 2d 225, 92 S.
Ct. 251 (1971).
The Stanton case just cited is one of a series of cases
under the same name that dealt with the issue of whether the
Utah statute which specified a greater age of majority for
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males than for females denied, in the context of a parent's
child support obligation, the equal protection of the lam
as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.

In analyzing

this is sue, the United States Supreme Court set forth the
following test:
"The test here, then, is whether the difference;.
sex between children warrants the distinction in ...
the appellee' s obligation to support that is dw;::
by the Utah statute.
Stanton, supra, at 14, 43
L.Ed. 2d 688, 95 S.Ct. 1373.
The Court's holding in that case was clear and unequivocal:
"We therefore conclude that under any test-compelling state interest, or rational basis, or
something in between--§15-2-1, in the context of
child support, does not survive an egual protectir
attack.
In that context, no valid distinction
between male and female ma be drawn." [Emphasis
added Stanton, supra, at 17, 43 L.Ed. 2d 688, 95
S.Ct. 1373.
The importance of the Stanton decision is that the Court
made clear that in any situation or circumstance in the
child support context, both male and female children mus:

:e

treated as reaching the age of majority at the same age.
Although the U.S. Supreme Court declared the Utah
statute unconstitutional, it did not attempt to fix the age
of majority for Utah.

Rather, it remanded the case for soc'.

determination to the Utah Court.

On remand, this Court

concluded that females reach the age of majority at age
eighteen.

Stanton v. Stanton, 552 P. 2d 112 (Utah 1976) ·

!~

the early Stanton cases the age of the male child was neve
"called into question."

Stanton, supra, at 113. However,

the Utah Supreme Court recognized that under the equal
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protection clause its decision as to females would ultimately
and inevitably be applied to males in the same context.
T~us,

after some further proceedings, this Court concluded,

in an opinion by Justice Hall, that,
" . . . the prior decision of this court, made at a
time when the age of majority statute was invalid,
and which determined that females reached the age
of majority at age eighteen, had the effect of
imposing majority upon both males and females at
age eighteen. The amendment to Section 15-2-1 has
seemed to further clarify the status of Utah law
and establishes as a matter of public policy the
age of majority for both sexes at age eighteen."
[Emphasis added] Stanton v. Stanton, 564 P. 2d
303, 304-5 (Utah 1977).
Plaintiff admits the Utah Court's determination of age
of majority for males has force only as dictum.

However,

the Court's decision that females reach age of majority at
age eighteen leads necessarily to the application of that
age to males because:
"The thrust of Stanton I, and therefore the starting
point for the Utah Court on remand, was that males
and females cannot be treated differently for
child support purposes consistently with the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution."
[Emphasis added] Stanton v. Stanton, 429 U.S. 501,
503, 50 L. Ed. 2d 723, 97 S. Ct. 717 (1977).
Thus, whether by extension of the age of majority for
females to males under the equal protection clause, or
directly under the Utah Supreme Court's determination of age
eighteen for men, the result is the same, to-wit: the age of
~ajority

for both males and females for child support purposes

is and must be eighteen.

Any contrary holding by this court

would deprive the plaintiff of his equal protection of the
law and would be therefore unconstitutional.
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POINT IV

THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR WHEN HE
INCREASED THE ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT BECAUSE THEY HAD
BEEN INCREASED, IN OCTOBER 1973, BASED AS THE SAME SET OF
CIRCUMSTANCES ALLEGED IN THE IHSTANT MOTION AND ORDER TO
SHOW CAUSE.

It is firmly established in Utah law that the party
seeking to modify a divorce decree must prove that "material"
circumstances have "substantially" changed since the original
decree or the most recent or subsequent modifications or
amendments were adopted.

Gale v. Gale, 123 Utah 277, 258 P.

2d 986 (1953); Ring v. Ring, 29 Utah 2d 436, 511 P. 2d 155
(1973); Hendricks v. Hendricks, 91 Utah 553, 63 P. 2d 277
(1936).

Such a change in circumstances must be substantial

and may not include factors which "were within the knowledge
and contemplation of the court when the modified order was
entered . . . "
511 (1973).

Hears v. Mears,

Iowa ___, 213 N.W. 2d

Especially important in the case at bar is the

requirement that the changes in circumstances must be oermanent
and continuous, not temporary, Carson v. Carson, 87 Utah
1, 47 P. 2d 394 (1935); Spaulding v. Soaulding, _ _ Iowa
_ _ , 204 N.W. 2d 634 (1973); Heidemann v. Heidemann, 96
Idaho 602, 533 P. 2d 96 (1974); Murphy v. Murphy, 26 Ariz.
App. 302, 547 P. 2d 1102 (1976); and the requirement that

such changes must have occurred or arisen since the date of

20
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the most recent proceeding which considered the situation of
the parties.

Dworak v. Dworak,

740 (1972); Haase v. Haase,

Iowa
Colorado

I

___

195 N.H. 2d

, 376 P. 2d

698 (1962); Spaulding, supra; Mears, supra.
Following the trial of this matter the lower court
concluded there had been a change of circumstances and
ordered an increase in support and alimony.

(R. 110-111]

The Findings of Fact of the lower court indicate the change
of circumstances upon which the court's order was based:
"4.
That since the entry of said decree of divorce
and the amendments thereto, the defendant has
experience a change of circumstances in that she
has become disabled due to illness and phvsical
problems . . .
"S. That subsequent to the decree of divorce, the
minor son, Verlin Kay, suffered rheumatic fever.
"6. That subsequent to the decree of divorce, the
defendant has experienced a change of circumstances in that the costs of living have increased
substantially. . "
[R. 110] [Emphasis added]
Plaintiff submits the court's Findings of Fact i~umber 4
is contrary to the evidence which clearly shows disability
due to illness and physical problems occurred ~ to the
last amendment in October 1973, and was in fact specifically
relied on by the Family Court Connnis s ioner as a groi.md for
increasing the alimony and support payments at that time.
[R. 107]

The modification to the decree by the Family Court

Commissioner is acknowledged by the court in Finding of Face
number 2 which states:

"2. That subsequent to said decree of divorc~, ,.,
the same was amended, whereby plaintiff's obllgat··
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to pay support was increased voluntarily, pursuant
to letter agreement in October of 1974.
(R.
109] [The date of October 1974 appears to be in
error since the letter agreement referred to is
dated October 1973. See R. 107]
The record is not totally clear as to all the details surrounding
the October 1973 amendment.

However, it is clear that there

was a series of letters written by Allen Hodgson, Family
Court Commissioner [R. 108], whereby the financial, health
and other circumstances of the parties were considered [R.
107] and the decree amended to increase plaintiff's payment
to defendant from $170 per month for the support of two
minor children and the wife to $220 per month for the same
number of persons.

Unfortunately neither the Family Court

Cormnissioner in his letter decision [R. 107) nor the trial
judge in his findings, conclusions, or decree [R. 109-113]
ever stated how much of this $220 monthly support payment
was for alimony and how much was for child support for each
of the minor children.
However, the Family Court Commissioner did clearly
state the changes in circumstances he was considering.

He

states:
"Your former wife has responded to my letter of
October 11. Her health will not oermit her to
work more than about three davs a·week for church
welfare, where she is permitted to work at her own
pace. She receives food and clothing in return
for that work. She has never been advised of the
monetary value of the food and clothing but I
assume it would not average more than $100.00 per
month. Her disability is such that she receives
$200.00 per month from Social Security.
"She acknowledges that the house is now paid for
and she is relieved of the $81.00 per month
payment." [R. 107]
22
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It appears clear the wife's total disability as determfoe:'
by the Family Court Co=issioner had not worsened between
October 1973 and the date of the hearing in the instant
case.

[R. 107, Tr. 23-26, 36 and particularly lines 18-20]

The wife was still able to work for church welfare assistance
at the time of the hearing to the same extent she had in
October 1973.

[Tr. 36]

Consequently, there was no basis

for increasing the alimony in this regard.
Furthermore, the social security payments had increased
from $200 per month in October 1973, to $221. 60 at the time
of the instant hearing.

[Tr. 26]

Both of those amounts are

the same as the wife was earning in 1964 when the original
decree was filed [R. 5] and in 1967 at the time of the first
modification [R. 54].

Consequently, the wife's income was

the same in 1964, 1967, 1973, and 1977 and consequently
could not be any economic basis for justifying an increase
in alimony.

In addition the wife's house was paid for by

October 1973 and that gave the wife an added economic
benefit of Eighty-one Dollars ($81) per month that she did
not have earlier.

[R. 107]

The lower court also erred in finding the son's rheUI!IE.tic
fever with its resultant costs [Finding {fa5, R..110] constitutec
sufficient grounds for increasing Plaintiff's support and
alimony obligations.

The cases cited in the first paragraoh

of this Point establish the rule that a change in circumstance'
must be permanent and continuous, not temporary.
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Verlin

suffered rheumatic fever in "the middle of March in '74."
[Tr. 28]

His recovery was so complete as to allow him to

spend the summer of 1977 working full-time on a pineapple
plantation in the Hawaiin Islands.

[Tr. 9-10]

At the time

of trial Verlin's bout with rheumatic fever only required
him to undergo an annual physical check-up [Tr. 28] and to
take 30t worth of medication per day (2 tablets per day,
tablets are $15. 00 per 100 or 15t each).

[Tr. 28] Plaintiff

contends this fact situation is clearly insufficient to
support a necessary finding of either a material, or a
permanent change of circumstances.
As to Defendant's allegations and the court's Findings
of Fact Number 6 that increases in the cost of living,
inflation, standing by itself is a sufficient factor to
warrant an increase in alimony, this conclusion is also
erroneous.

It is a circumstance that bears equally upon

both parties and should therefore be considered irrelevant.
In Schweidler v. Schweidler, 329 Ill. App. 643, 70 N.E. 2d
39 (1946), the divorced wife petitioned the court to modify

its decree of divorce to increase alimony.

As one of the

grounds for her petition she alleged the increased cost of
living, or inflation.

On appeal the court held that the

increased cost of living "is il!IIllaterial and need not be
considered" since "such fact affects both parties similarly."
Clearly Defendant has failed to establish that the
circumstances of her health and finances have changed since

24
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the date of the most recent amendment or proceeding which
was October 1973.

With respect to the instant hearing

vis a vis the 1973 amendment hearing, the court's statement
in Haase, supra is pertinent:

"Although we do not have the benefit of a transcrip·
of the hearing first held on the original petition·
for modification, it is clear from the testimony
in the second hearing that the alleged changes of
circumstances were exactly the same . . . (S)uffice
it to say that the court in the second hearing was
limited to inquiry into a change--if any--since
the last order. Haase, supra, at 699.
Plaintiff submits the lower court also erred in its
statement at trial that the divorced wife is entitled to any
increases in her husband's income after the divorce. In
Dehm v. Dehm, 545 P. 2d 525 (Utah 1976), where alimony was
reduced from $300. 00 per month to $1. 00 per year, this Court
held that:
"Although an increase in the income of a divorced
wife does not, of itself, determine a reduction of
alimony; neither does an increase in the income of
a divorced husband, of itself, determine the
maintenance of alimony." Dehm, supra, at 528.
Similarly, the Arizona Appellate Court denied a petition for
increased alimony, holding that:
"An increase in the earning capacity of the
husband after the divorce, standing alone, how·
ever, is not sufficient. A former wife has n~
continuing right to share in future accumul~tl~
of wealth by her divorced husband." [Emphasis
added]
Sheeley v. Sheeley, 10 Ariz. App. 318, 458
P. 2d 522 (l969) at 525.
Similarly, "The defendant's increase in income does not
necessarily require an increase in his obligations to the
plaintiff.

. ."

Hunsaker v. Fake, 563 P. 2d 784 (Utah
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1 971 ~

The plaintiff submits the above references and discussion
amply show the trial judge had no basis for increasing the
alimony and child support for the reasons he described in
his Findings of Facts Numbers 4, 5, and 6 [R. 110-111].
Consequently, the decision of the trial judge must be reversed
with respect to these increases. This court should further
remand the case for the trial judge to determine what portion
of the $220 monthly payments awarded by the Family Court
Commissioner related to child support payments for each of
the minor children and deduct from the $220 per month the
amount attributable to the child Roger Allen who had reached
majority [May 27, 1975] at the time of the instant hearing.
In this respect the law in Utah is that the Supreme
Court may review this case on the record and is not bound by
the lower court's findings.
for reversal.

Gross error is not necessary

In Hendricks, supra, at 279 the court said,

"This court is required to review the evidence in
the nature of a trial de novo on the record and
the appellant is entitled--CO-the judgment of this
court, as well as the trial court, on this question."
It has further been determined by this Court,
"that it is not necessary for this court to find a
gross abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court before modifying the judgment as to alimony.
In conclusion, plaintiff submits there has been no
significant change of circumstance since the decree was last
amended.

All of the facts and circumstances alleged by
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defendant and included in the Court's findings as the basis
for increasing alimony and child support were within the
knowledge and contemplation of the parties and the family
court cormnissioner when Plaintiff's payments were increased
under the 1973 amendment or modification from $170 per month
to $220 per month.
Plaintiff further submits the lower court's findings of
changed circumstances are not supported by the evidence in
this case and that any change of circumstances since 1973 is
neither sufficient not substantial, continuous nor permanent.
Consequently, the lower court incorrectly increased alimony
and child support based on said findings and thereby abused
its discretion in this matter.

Plaintiff asks this court to

correct these errors and reverse the lower court's findings,
conclusions, judgment and order on this issue.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion the plaintiff respectfully requests this
court to reverse the trial judge with respect to the increased
alimony and child support and to affirm the trial judge with
respect to the child support payments for Roger Allen after
he reached age 18.

The plaintiff also requests this court

to remand this case to the trial judge to determine what
portion of the family court cormnissioner's $220 monthly
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award was for alimony and what portion was for child support
for each of the minor children and to delete from the said
$220 that portion attributable to Roger Allen after he
reached age 18 on May 27, 1975.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED
McMURRAY, McINTOSH, BUTLER & NIELSEN
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